Deportation or Holocaust?

There have been numerous occasions in history when the phenomenon of transfer has occurred. Originally, transfer meant the resettlement of people, but more recently it has also come to refer to the transportation of articles and even complete fortunes. In general it was a consequence of political or military defeat, since (at least in the case of economic transfer) the riches and goods that were taken made the benefi ciaries of the transfer wealthy. Resettlement has been all too familiar in Jewish history. The best-known instance of resettlement is probably the period of so-called Babylonian Captivity (598–538 BC, under the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II), when a signifi cant portion of the population of Judaea was resettled in Babylon. There were several waves of deportations, but they were never utter or complete, since the conquerors used their usual methods with the Jews and there was nothing particular or discriminative in their actions. As we understand it today, however, the word transfer clearly refers to aff airs of an economic nature. While properties and stores of wealth were transferred in the course of resettlements in ancient times as well, there was no modern bank and credit system that would have  ade complicated transactions possible across international borders. Moreover, the tools of modern economics made it possible for the politically defeated to strive to turn their unfortunate circumstances (whether momentary or permanent) to relatively acceptable economic profit.  The Zionist publicist “prepared” the transfer of 600,000 Jews to Palestine, or rather he indulged in fantasies about such a transfer. Parallel to the Nazi rise to power in Germany, the Jewish Agency, the “foreign ministry,” as it were, of the Zionist movement, strove to transfer Jewish wealth from Germany to Palestine. The Zionist organizations, mostly the leaders of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, endeavored to use the German-Jewish wealth in their nation building eff orts in Palestine. From this perspective, the process was the inverse of the one that took place at the time of the captivity in Babel, since the wealth was transferred from the Diaspora to the Holy Land, the mother country. Economic factors made it possible only for the wealthy to emigrate, but at that time it was not clear that every Jewish person was in danger, so economic circumstances were the primary consideration, and indeed provided the impetus and momentum of the  whole process. The fate (and wealth) of more than 500,000 Jews living in Germany presented a serious dilemma to the Germans and the Zionist leaders as well, who in the beginning wanted the emigrant Jews to be able to bring monies equivalent to 1,000 pounds each to Palestine. That was the minimum amount of money the so-called A1 group (the wealthy) had to pay if they wanted to emigrate. After lengthy negotiations, in which German Zionists and the leaders of the Jewish Agency participated, an agreement was reached on August 25th, 1933. This was timely, because on April 1st an economic boycott had begun against the Jewish communities, and in September, one month after the agreement, anyone of Jewish origin was removed from his or her position. According to the agreement, two clearing institutes were established to facilitate the process of transfer (in banking and fi nance, clearing denotes all activities from the time a commitment is made for a transaction until it is settled): Paltreu [Palästina-Treuhandstelle zur Beratung deutscher Juden, or Palestine Trust Office for Advice to German Jews], which was controlled by the German Zionist League, and the Haavara Company [Haavara is Hebrew for transfer], located in Tel Aviv. They set up two accounts, the so-called Konto I (Account I) for the existing emigrants, who had to pay the required amount of money to the German account of Paltreu. From the economic perspective the process was the following: the German exporters sold their goods in Palestine and deposited the profi ts they had made from the sales in the Haavara accounts. They paid the exchange value of their marks (German currency at the time) in Palestinian pounds. Konto II was set up for those who were considering the possibility of emigration. German Jews could deposit their money in this account, but it could not be transferred until the deposits of Konto I had been repaid. This resulted in the emigration of several thousand wealthy Jews from Germany to Palestine. – alleged – egoistic relationship of Hungarian Jewry to Palestine.) The speculations of the Jewish Agency did not prove groundless, but the political situation made it impossible for them to take advantage of the economic opportunities to the fullest possible extent. The negotiations carried on by the Jewish Agency in Hungary can be divided into diff erent stages. The fi rst discussions took place between the summer of 1938 and February 1939, the second between February and October of the same year. The Hungarian Zionist League, its Economic Committee in particular, began the negotiations with the Chamber of Commerce in Budapest, the National Bank and the Offi ces of Foreign Trade. The approval of these institutes was indispensable from a political point of view. On August 21st, 1938, the Jewish Agency submitted the completed memorandum, which bore the signature of Jichak Grünbaum (one of the leaders of the Jewish Agency), to the National Bank “on the subject of the Hungarian-Palestinian agreement on transfer.” The

document consisted of parts in English that had been translated into Hungarian, and also contained statistical data. An entire chapter (Chapter 5) was dedicated to the planned agreement. From Hungary’s perspective, the agreement was advantageous because the buyers would pay in foreign currency for all exports the raw materials of which (and other expenses) had had to be purchased by Hungary in foreign currency. The plan also contained stipulations allowing for fi nancial provisions taken from funds provided by the more affl uent in order to assist the poor in their emigration to Palestine. The money for the transfer would have been obtained by the clearing of the pecuniary assistance sent by diff erent individuals and Jewish organizations to Hungarian institutes and Jewish persons. Some amount of the foreign currency coming from the Hungarian exports directed to other countries would have also been used for this purpose. According to the plan, the Hungarian Zionist League would set up an organization to oversee the processes of transfer. A fixed time would be established for the agreement by the Hungarian government and the Jewish Agency, since the setting up of the organization and the arrival of foreign currency from the first consignment of goods would have taken some time. The Jewish Agency wanted the agreement to be signed for a period of three months of preparatory time and one year of operation. That the vision held by the leaders of Haavara was not completely irrational (and that it was also widely known) is made clear by the fact that when Sándor Eppler, the secretary-general of the Israelite Religious Community of Budapest, met with Martin Rosenblueth in London, the only word he knew with regards to Palestine was Haavara.